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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA M. OLSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff RWJ 
\ppellant, 
Suorerne \omt Clo. 
KENNETH OLSON, 
Defendant >ind 
Respondent. 
BRlEF OF APPELLANT 
LINDA M. OLSON 
N,\TCRE OF THE 
This is an action f,,r R in "l11eh the :1Jso <oua;ht :-i 
property settlement, child s11011ort :rna ali:nonv. 
UISPO:SITJI>'< LO\I LI{ 
On \lay 13, 198:3. t!1e lot.'<?r 1• 1)tJrt >?ntcr<><j :1 (lecrec of divorce in 
settlement, Hnd awarrh_-(J oiutntiff •!11li-1 -;urpnrt (frJr three :11inor in 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant Linda \I. Olson seeks reversal of the decree as to the 
prnpertv settlement and the alimony decreed, but not from the entry of the 
decree of divorce. 
STATE\1ENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and defendant were married on December 21, 1960, 
approximately six months after plaintiff graduated from high school. At that 
time plaintiff was eighteen years old. Six children have been born as issue of 
the marriage. As of the date of the decree of divorce, three children were 
emancipated and three children (ages 16, 11 and 3 years) resided with the 
plaintiff, who was awarded custody of the said three minor children. The 
parties separated approximately two years before the trial when defendant 
went on a trip and didn't return to the home of the parties. When appellant 
called him, defendant said he was not returning home. (R. 85.) The evidence 
does not disclose any other basis for the separation of the parties, which 
resulted in the divorce. 
At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was employed by Utah Power 
and Light doing typing work. She worked at that employment for approximately 
six months after the marriage at which time she quit her employment because 
she was five months pregnant. (R. 81.) 
Thereafter she was a full-time homemaker who bore and raised the 
six cl1ildren of the parties and provided a home for the defendant and their 
"ilildren. (R. 82.) 
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As A consequencP. h;1s nPver '_i;aintullv in 
substantial sense in the h1bor 1n.8rk0t (e\:CPDt f·x :)!J.!'t-t1mP, rninirnurn 
jobs since the filing of the compl!l.int lwre1nl. 'in<1 'I"' 11'1' no training .vllicll 
would suit her for gainful emplovme11t 11t tl1c time of tl1c entrv of tlw c'ecree. 
(R. 81-83.) 
On the other han11, the defendR.nt <111ring tl1e course of the marriage 
worked and supported the famil\. \t 111,, time of the trial herein he had 
formed his own consulting company, known as Ricl1t1rc:s - Olson \ssociates, 
which is a Utah corporation. IR. lll6.) Tl1P husin<'ss of tile defendant. either 
personally or through his cor·poration c-onsists of personal services in consulting 
primarily a variet_1: g0vernmental organizations on organizational 'Tiatterc;, 
such as the evaluation of <late governments anr1 state o;ovcrnment organizati0ns, 
the operations of governor's offices and other acti\'ities to stnte 
governments generallv. For example hetween 1979 an<1 1981, the ,jefendant 
had a contract with the Dec>art.nent rif State Hnd the State of Utah to PVa!uate 
the impact of the \IX '.J1ssile System at one t11ne planned to IJe loc:it.cd in 
Utah. !R. I 04-108.) 
Defendant testified tli>H the tvpical mnnrwr 0f conducting tl1P bllsiness 
was to enter into consul ting cont mets on either !l. -;hart-term (two to three 
months) or a lon[(-term (one ve·1r to eight••en months) lx1s1s. m. 104.) The 
defendant's te'ilimonv in<11C'8te.J th:it lie hMI '>een Able to huild the ':lusiness to 
the point 1NhPrc it w11-.;, (Jevl'lop11•'-.'.," c;1Jtl':-tant1al 1nt•nr;H" at the tune of the trial 
of this matter. While the ti?stimnn': of d(·fPnrlnnt ,11owed that hie;; incorne 
fluctuated sorne,xl10.t 1J1Jt)fl the· r•nntr·ic•t<.:: lfl f'or(•e at ;1n 11 tirn<>. 
t :,., '''''"'t fu1md tilat defendant produced a gross income in 1980 in the amount 
,f nnd in 1981 in the amount of $62,603.00 (R. 60). The defendant 
also test1f1Pd tliat at the time of the trial his salary annualized (based upon 
tl1e first pRrt of the year) would figure out to "something like $67 ,000.00 per 
1ear.'' (R. 106.) This approximates the court's finding to the effect that in 
1982 defendant had produced a gross income in the amount of $57,000.00 to 
the time of trial (Oct. 4, 1982) and that he believed he would obtain another 
contract which he was negotiating at that time, which would produce income 
to defendant in the amount of $3,500.00 per month (R. 60.) over the remaining 
three months of 1982. This would produce an additional income of $10,500.00, 
or a total of $67,500.00 for 1982. 
Plaintiff testified that she had filed a financial declaration with the 
court prior to the time of the trial which showed that the average living 
expenses of the family for the last years prior to the separation amounted to 
$5,500.00 per month. (R. 85.) She testified that she felt she needed $4,200.00 
per month to maintain the household as it had been maintained, taking into 
!1ccount the e:-.-penses of herself and three minor children residing at home. 
rR. 87.) The financial declaration filed by defendant showed his monthly living 
expense to be $2,837.00 (R. 115.). 
In its decree of divorce, the lower court ordered among other things: 
'l) That defende.nt should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,600.00 
oer ,nontil, which should continue for only two years, after which alimony 
-;l10uld ('ease. b) ThHt defendant 'hould pay to plaintiff for the care and 
n1ni11ten11nce of the minor cl1ilrlren of the parties $200.00 per child, which 
eighteen and graduate'S frorn -.;ef1c1nl !11...: or hf'r (•li1s...;. 
The <Jecree of rJivor<:'e cil'o nr,1crcrl Fl division of propPrtv ;-iccumulfltcrl 
during the marriaise, which will '>e st1te<J in cnnrc cld:1il '">elow. 
ST\TE',JENT OF P<ll'HS O'l \PPE\L 
POINT ONE. THE PIWPEl<fY SETTLE\lENT DECREED F.\ILED TO 
TAKE INTO CONSIDER,\TION Tl IE \ ALL:E OF L\R'l!NG .\R!L!TY OF 
THE DEFEND . \ NT, OR Ir THr: SA \l[ \V \S <"(l'lSirlER[D, TllE DECREE 11'.\S 
. .\RBITRARY AND CAPRICHlCS \Nil GIWSSL Y l'l \DEQU,\TE IN T!!E 
. .\ \!OU'.'JT AIV:\RDED TO PL.\IN rJFr. 
POlNT TWO. THF THL.\L COl'RT \f;L'S[n ITS !)!SCRETION \\'ITH 
RESPE1_'T TO T!lF .\I\ \RU OF \Ll\IONY \S T() TllE .\ \lOL'NT AND TllE 
DllR.\TlON OF TllE AIVARD. 
\RGL'\IF'lT 
POINT ONE 
THE PROPERTY SETTLE\ICNT DECREFD F \ILEll TO L\l\E 
CONSIDERATIO:\ r1JE \ \LUE OF fl![ J:.\ll'll\JC .\BIUTY OF 
DEFENDANT. OR IF Tiff SA\lE \\ \S CO'lO'IDEREll. Till: llECREE 
ARBITRARY AND C.\PRICIOUS :\ND CIWSSLY IN.\IJF:QL'\TE IC: 
AWARDED TO PL \l'lT!FF. 
INTO 
TllE 
\V \S 
TllE 
The trial court Jp:wll:rnt the """ of the familv home until 
the first of the f01iowing »ec-11rr1•r,0 es: 
b. Until thl' humc" 1; 'H' 
c. l'ntil 'lfTi('' ,Jr ,\'1th 'l ·n:1n to ·1,ho·n .:.;he is 
l:pon the happening of the first of the above events, the home was 
ornered to be sold and the proceeds of the sale divided equally between the 
p11rti es. 
The trial court divided the property between the parties as follows: 
To plaintiff (appellant): 
a. One-half the equity in 
the family home upon sale 
(no value specified). 
b. Her personal effects and 
jewelry (no value specified). 
c. Furniture, fixtures and appliances 
located at the family home (no 
value specified). 
d. 1977 Chevrolet automobile 
To defendant (respondent): 
a. One-half the equity ·in 
the family home upon sale 
(no value specified). 
b. His personal effects (no value 
specified). 
c. :vlembership in the Sports \fall 
(having a value of $1,200.00). 
d. 1980 Buick Skylark automobile 
e. The professional consulting 
business. 
f. The retirement account (having a 
value of $15,359.00). 
With respect to the value of the home, the appellant estimated it to 
be worth approximately $170,000.00 less a mortgage on the premises in the 
amount of $33,000.00 leaving a net equity of $137,000.00. She apparently 
formed her opinion based on a valuation given her by a realtor. (R. 17.) 
Respondent on the other hand testified that in his opinion, the value of the 
liome was 5235,000.00 less a mortgage of approximately $29,000.00 which would 
le'l'IC u n"t equity of $206,000.00. According to his testimony he based his 
'lninio11 on "watching comparable sales in the area during the time when the 
l'<eal estate market was moving." (R. ll8.) However, he also admitted that 
llic t1 rne when real estate was moving was approximately two years before 
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the time of the tri8.l, that hl' 1ll't-'n r 11 1t '11lP thP '-t.1tP nf f0r 
the year prior to the trial, c1n« th,1t 111' '"" ""t :rn"1re of :1m· "lie' of real 
estate in the neighborhooci wher0 !'Rrnil\' l1ome 1<; lo1"1tPd dllring that year. 
(R. 128.) 
With respect to t11e f11rnit11r('. f1Jrn1sl1ir1gs :in11 0quirment located in 
the family home, the respondent tPst1f1ed tll!lt in his opinion the value w::is 
$20,000.00. (R. iloweve1', on <'ro-ss examination he testified that 
that was his estimate of the llmount it would take to reolace the furniture 
for insurance purposes. (R. 1 .) rlw;, of course, does not indicate anything 
about t11e age and present <'ontJi\ion of the furnit11re, and it i'i not the stand,mi 
for rictermining its value !which is what a willing buver would pay to a willing 
seller). He also st3ted \fiat the furniture woultJ not vield verv much if it 
were sold, as for example at a garage ..;ale. IR. I ?8.) Furti1ermore, there is 
evidence that not all the furniture, fixtures and appliancr>s were awarded to 
plaintiff. (See R. 2o where defer1dant proposed "Each party should he awarded 
the household furnishings ... now in r1i'i 0r h<'r rossc>ssi0n.") It 1s respectfullv 
submitted that the award nf the furniture was based upon the needs of the 
family and that any !lct1rnl VAiue of these items was immaterial. 
It is clear thnl the item ,,f rno..;t "'lbstanti:ll value which the parties 
had accumulated their >!DHrt frail! tlw home. was t:1e consulting 
business, which the tr1AI •:ollrt :iwar'•lecl ent11·"i'I to the resDondent without 
determining its value. 
The evidenee .vJtl1 tn the ')f defencbnt (:1s 
summarized in the Statement A !'·wt':, ·1l1ovel inc1iC':1tes t11:1t. while at tllf• 
time 0f the trial the defendant had no signed contracts, he believed he would 
ulJlain a contract which he was then negotiating (R. 105) and that the average 
earn1nf;s of the business over the last three years was $68,862.67 per year. 
m. 110-11?.) 
The average earnings of the defendant for the prior three year period 
gives a fairly accurate indication of the defendant's earning ability. However, 
it is clear from the remarks at the trial court at the conclusion of the trial, 
that the defendant's earning ability was not taken into account by the trial 
court in determining the property settlement decreed. 
In summary, the court stated as follows: 
"In order for you to survive and your wife to survive you're going to 
have to sell your house and live on that money and both of you rent 
and do away with all of the things which you've now enjoyed while 
you were married. There is no way you can maintain two households 
at the same level you maintained one on your present producing-free 
income unless you get a business contract. 
"! don't think I'm willing to speculate with your wife's life and your 
children's lives of you getting a big contract. It looks the only way 
we can get this worked out is to sell that house." (R. 129-130). 
Therefore, the trial court ordered that the family home be sold in a maximum 
of two years (i.e., when the oldest child reaches eighteen years of age) and 
the proceeds divided equally among the parties, apparently for the purpose of 
p1·ov1<1ing them with a resource to live on. However, the court also awarded 
tn 1'1e deferi<1ant the full interest in the business and the retirement account 
.vh1<"t1 !1C1d been built up during the course of the marriage. 
Economists view the family as a decision-making unit which allocates 
its ·1v·1ila>ilc "csources for the mutual good of the family unit, by joint decision. 
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See. J(r:iuskopf Rerornpense for \111nn1•inC'. i .;1J('·1t1nn: Pr()tc:r•t1on 
for the \1arital Investor of llurn•in r_::_ri,,11 d. »< ''''"· I .. p,., .. 17'1 .. lH•; 11 '.l80l. 
Trac'.itionally, after marriage, couples 1'hons1• !11 h:1\'<' 1.v1vrs 1lcvot0 full or part-
time to housekeeping nn<i child-»:irc :11'!1 v1t10s. \Vhik tilL·v· ·1ho ehoos0 to have 
husbands devote their full tune to cmpln•;ment in t!w lahor market. \ s 1 
consequence over Ute years of n ltH.' h11shi:i.nd inrr0;:ises hi.:;; 
skills in income-producing activ1t1es finrl tra11\lng, nnd ilso '"lcqu1rcs seni•)rit:; 
rights anrl pension benefits, while the wife incre'1S«s Iler 11bilitv anr1 skill in 
and nurturing activitif's, :'tit srtrr1fier;-.; the trninini:;. c\'.oe:it:nee 
and seniority bendits whieh she 11·011lrl neP<1 1f she •.v·ore required to provice 
for her own ·•uooort. 
The traditional div1'1on of does ')endit t11e fnmilv 1mit, ho1•:evcr, 
by maximizing the husband's earning CRpHcitv. The wife's work nt home frees 
the husband to eoneentrR.te ·)n h1" ;ii ·1r 1..:et work the nc·n1ll;;:.ition of pro9ert:.,: 
for the family. This results 111 'Tl 1rr1ed 'nen t1qving higher lif»tir,1e eRrninr;s 
and longer. healthier lives thc-tll 1m1narrierl mPn. SeP L2nrlec;, Ec0n0rn!('S of 
7 J. Le<:;al Stud. :J'i. t'1i< of labor 
signifie::rntly reduces the 'thilit" nf ·.v1vt>--; to mcome. sho1Jlrj thP\' bf' 
required to do so t>ecqu-;e •)I t:ieir laC'k •1f nqrl1"inAtion, trnining Rnci 
of sKilb in .wL1v1111:-.;. 
These fHctors havi:> dirr> 1 •t cJ[1DlH"1t1fln t•) tt10 hnr. ThP f11C"t'-' 
of this case "how the ·11·1r'"i"'(4 'tftcr tl1(' ·vife ·:2_"r.·idtinted 
from high schno! :1nd hefr)rl' <;;.1l0 ·.v,i" ·i!'I" t,\ "•'IJ!·\cr 'UJ\' j()h L'rvJn the 
marriage the part1e<:, :llloC':1t(i' 1111rn·1r1 1"1,)it.11 nf thi-.; n1_'\\' !'·1:nJ\\' 1tnit in 
11, .. ,. ·''''"'"'',,,,item, ''Ith the result that for the next twenty-two years the 
rt· rJ,.1,,,tP•I her f11ll-time activity to homemaking and nurturing activities and 
11"' 1111,lltrnri dev,)t 0 d his full-time activities to earning a living, which in the 
0 1 "' :it hrtr 0nhc1nced his skills to the point where he became a counselor to 
gcivernors Rnd other governmental entities, and developed a business with an 
ineo111e-proclu0ing capacity averaging over $68,000.00 per year for the most 
recent three-year period prior to the time of the trial. Under these 
circumstances, it is grossly inequitable to terminate this marriage without 
taking into account the wife's right to receive a fair and equitable share of 
this earning capacity, which she helped produce, in a division of the property 
Accumulated 'w the parties during the marriage. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a wife's right to receive a 
fair and equitable share of such financial benefits. In the case of Savage vs. 
SRvao-e, 8:i8 P.2d 1201 (1983) the facts were somewhat similar to the facts in 
the c11se at bar. In that case the parties were married about twenty years. 
However, unlike the present case, the wife in the Savage case had some earning 
abilitv in thst she had a college degree and had taught school for two years 
after t11e marriag-e. Thereafter she was a full-time homemaker and caretaker 
for the three children of the parties. Even though the husband had been 
o':c11p1ed 11urinr:>; the full term of the marriage (and even before the marriage) in 
a busi11es'i ow11ed by his family, the court awarded the wife 4096 of the stock 
rn th·1t '111;,n<>>S .vt11el1 lwd been accumulated by the parties during their 
11, ,rrr rr w ltustiand ohJC'Cterl to this property settlement. On appeal the 
" 11r1r1•!ne 1 'otirt of Ltah st ited: 
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"In view of the '20-ve.·lr nf tl11..;; nnd tlw [:i.(lt 
that both parties full-t1:iw .,rr J1't' thr,,11g>1n11t t'1Ht 
period to the e11ds of the m11rriai;;e. \1\1•' -.;r'f' no 1dJthE' nf 
discretion in the 40"n nO \, split fash1onc<1 hi' tile trial l'OUrt. 
Virtuallv the eutire [)resent val1Ji' of the C'orpnr.1tions \\'as 
developed during thP m·1rria:,;e .Jn<1, wl1ilc it is true tl111t the 
plaintiff took no responsibilitv for the L111sincss, 1t was her 
assumption of the c101T1c>>tiC' b11r<1ens whi"h madr possi'ile the 
defendant's full-time oarti<'1p:it1on in the husincss. She is 
therefore entitled tn a .fair and equitablP s!wr1, of the finilne1al 
benefits A.ecumulflted bv virtue of their ioint dforts in the 
marriage." 
The case of Dahlber"' vs. nahlherrr, 77 Ut. 157. 292 Pcic. 0 1;, also recoi:;nile'1 
the right of a wife to share in the propertv acquired durinc:; the 11rnrriage. 
The case involved a divorce of parties who ha<1 hc-en :l1flrried t1·1entv-seven 
years. Four children hac! been !Jorn as issue of the marriagP, two of whom 
were living with tlie wife at tlie time of the divorce. The trial <'ourt h11d 
awarded the ,vife approximately one-thirrl of the value of the propertv ac<iuired 
by the parties during the rn11rrwge 1rnrl 5he contended th:it ,11e 'l10uld have 
received one-half. In its .Jel'1s1,1n the l'tah Suorcrne C'o11rt st:ited as follows: 
"It is the contentiUn •)i the plaintiff th·it. in view th:it the 
parties harl been rna1T1c>c1 nnd lived together fr:ir more thcrn 
a quarter of a <'enturv, reared a fa1nilv, acqu1l'eci :ill of the 
property ::iossessicd b\' teem through their J•iint eff,Jrts, that 
all of the real es trite Rnd oersnnal orooert 1· oo"e'"ed >w 
them, though held in thP n:ime of U1e defendant: w>lS JUSt il.s 
much her property i' t!wt uf 11er hu,111\nd .... an equitrtblc> 
division of the propertv re<Juircd t11at ;he be :1w,1rdcd 8.t le:1st 
one-half of the value <lf the Joint prope>rty: . 
"In oorosition t0 Urnt 1t )<::: lhc f'()rltr>!lt1on of the rlPfPndnnt 
that as A gener;:tJ r11[1:. lrl rlJ VfJrc•p 1 rll\' .thOUt Gne--thir<j 
of the husband 1 ..:; Jr()oert· l'-l ,1'•':1rdr(' u, t!1P .v1f<·: .... 
* * * * * 
' 1\\e thin\-: the rul(' lqr· h\ tl1c ril.11rit1t'f 1s tht· 
correet r1Jl0 Y.nr1 i--; .r1 :Jr'(' ''<'lt!1 t'1i> Ld,'r r"':hP...; frnr:-i tt11'-
jurisdiction. <)f <'O!H"-)(_, t!.C' r)f '·1r>tl: iHrtJr>-., 
- l l -
·1rP to r,e considered, but, whatever doubt there may be 
•«JfW<>rning the matter, it ought to be resolved against the 
guilt> p11rty whose faults and wrongs and breaches of the 
•11a1·1tal relation destroyed the home and forced or brought 
11l1011t the separation. 
"In flecker vs. Decker supra, the court said 'It is also a rule 
of e•1uity in such cases that the wife shall not be put in a 
worse condition by reason of lier marriage, the dissolution of 
whieh has been caused by her husband's willful misconduct. 
Equity and good conscience require that the husband shall 
not profit by his own wrong, ... and also that a fair division 
shall be made taking into consideration the relative wants, 
circumstances and necessities of each, of the property 
f!Ccumulated by their joint efforts and savings.' " 
The supreme court concluded that under the facts cited above the interest of 
the plaintiff in "the whole of the property" accumulated through their joint 
<>fforts was equal to that of the husband and modified the decree accordingly. 
In the case at bar it is clear that the court would have to award the 
ownership of the business accumulated by the parties to the defendant, because 
the business, in essence, consists of his training and experience and demonstrated 
earning capacity, together with a pension account which had been accumulated 
in his name. 
Ilowever. it is .1lso equally clear that the trial court could, and should, 
have awarded to the plaintiff a share of the value of that business, equal to 
the interest which she helped to create. While no evidence was introduced at 
the time of the trial in the nature of an appraisal of the value of the business 
:iwnrded to plaintiff, the facts indicated by the average earning capacity of 
tt1e business would lend themselves to a mathematical computation of the value 
nf the 
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For example, defenJnnt was -l'.1 \'0·1rc.; 1)ld ·1t t!H' tirne •)r the tri:1l 
in apparent good health. If 111:·' 1nc-uin1: ',ver1: tn ·-1.t t_he '-'llrTlP 11vcr:lP,"C 
rate until he reached age li'.i. 01'er tl1:1t 11•.·r1od l11s IJusincss would prnducc 11 
total income of ,2'.d . .JO. There are ,tcinrlurd aceountinq; tables for 
determining the present value of n stream of future ineome. \ssuming a rate 
of return at lO"'u per :rnnum (the legtll interest ri!te), the present v11lue of 
that total income would be and one-half of that amount would 
be 5293,1:33.37. 
There are many factors, not presently foreseeciblc which could operate 
to di1nin1sh that value, such as the p0ss1bilit) of future ill health, so that it 
may not ':le reasoneb!P to •1ward 8.ppellant tlrnt full amount as being one-half 
the Vdlue of the business. However, it sl10uld be clear that there is a substantial 
value in the business which the court sho11!d have dividerl. 
There 11re a variety of methods which the court could have adopted 
in dividing this asscl. 0lher tl111n a lump sum cash award. For example, the 
court could have awarrlcd 8p[lellant g fixerJ percentag-e of the annual income 
of the business (up to A fi'oss annual income of the business of 
This would fairly cornpensatP for the v3.lue of the business tl1at wR.s 
jointly developed to t.he cjatc nf the ;;nc1 [c>qve any future growth to 
defendunt. This 1s similar to the res11lt decided UDOn in the SavaP-e c11se, 
supra. In the Savn>2:e c>11se, "1pr·1. tl1e ma3ority noted and the dissent urged 
that whenever [lOSsil1le "'"1t1nue<1 1ntPr•1ct1un ll\ reC1s0n of joint ownership b\' 
divorced spouses in 1 hl·ld r•nt0ror1S(' ')]1ould hP n voirled, -;o thR.t 
\not her 
· 11.i.' 111• 1·11 1i:ve 1•.n1Jld he to fix a value of the business to be awarded to 
''"r"'lirnt, 1nr1 nermit <1efcn<1nnt to oav it in installments. A more practical 
<0111 t1on w•11Jid tw to award the appellant the full equity in the family home 
•)f tile pal'\1es 11s an offset for the value of the business, which should have 
hcen aw11rded to appellant. Or the court could adopt any combination of the 
foregoing or other alternatives. 
POINT TWO 
'!'HE TRfA.J. \OURT A.BUSED !TS DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO THE 
,\\V OF . \11\"!0NY AS TO THE AND THE DURATION OF THE 
·\s noted in the Statement of Facts the trial court awarded the 
plaintiff $1,600.00 per month as alimony, but limited the award of alimony to 
two years. In its original memorandum decision the court ordered the plaintiff 
to pay alimony in the sum of $1,600.00 per month, but put no limit on the 
time the alimony was to be paid. (R. 51.) Subsequently on November 9, 1982, 
counsel for plaintiff and defendant appeared before the trial judge. A record 
was kept of the proceedings, in which the trial court indicated that the purpose 
of the hearing was for the court to explain the order it had heretofore entered 
und to hanc1le an objection by the defendant that he could not pay what the 
court hac1 ordererJ. 
In the course of the proceeding, the court indicated that it would be 
w1ll1nc; tr, »1rns1der that the aliinonv be for a limited period of time although 
Counsel for defendant suggested a ten 
ve·1r terrn ·1n11 the eo11rt rc-;pon1Jed "that's too long". Thereafter the court 
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can start retraining herself.'1 :'.uh-.;t-''jllt_'fil !'.· till' c•o11rt -;t.J.tPd: 
"! thinl< st1e's got to g•0 t out nnd lc1kr e:irP 0[ her'<:•lf. She 
just cannot sit ':lack ·rnrl get a m0nth from tl1is 
fellow and rlo nothing to help "lpport >wrsetf. Soc1ctv doesn't 
tolerate that from :rn\' nf u<s. That"; wllv ·ve 11rP all Prnploved . 
. .\nd she hns just t'1c ol•lig•1tions to take care of herself 
as we all hRve." m. 11G-l 111.l 
Thereafter the court .:ntererl its ordPr limiting the o>iyment of ll!imonv 
(at the rnte of 51,600.00 oer month) to " period of twn \'Pars from the date 
of the entry of the decree. 
In the cRse At bar 1t is clenr frn1n c<>n1 men ts of the trial jude-e 
th3.t he .Jir: not take into c•)nsid<'rntion the husl)anrl's c>Hrning :ibilitv or the 
realistic li'rntations on the wife's e•irning <'np;11•itv. in 11eter:nining the alimony 
to be awarded to the wife. Rather, it nrpcars that he disr<'garrled these 
important factors and focuseJ. inste&<1, upon tiH' aC'tunl 0arnings of the hushHnd 
at the time the decree .vqs entered in deciding the ,qrnoJJnt .vi1ich was to be 
awarded as alimony and the IPn§'.th of time it ''''" t•) be pHid. 
Prior to the trial 8Pp»llant had fikd a finirn<'ial declaration with the 
court which showed that !.fie liv1nQ" c"pe1bes of the fwnilv the 
three years preceding the '<eDHntion amo1mtr>d to 5-,,:ilJIJ.OO rer month. (R. 
18). \t the trinl she test1fiecJ th:d tl11:-; :1ilnr·nati•J11 wns upon ehec1's 
showing the Hctual amount nf tlw c'1wnws f<Jr '•JITlP \CMS prior tn the 
Siw 1C'stif1erl 
however that she felt she neu1e<J ri•·r 11•)nth t•J "in1nt:un t!h' 
'"": '""'n 1wuntained, triking into account the expenses of herself and 
1111 ,.,. :n1n"r 1•hildren residing at home. (R. 87.) The financial declaration 
f1i<'d l1v .Jcfcrid11nt sl10wed his monthly living expense to be $2,837.00 (R. 24, 
l I 1). 
The evidence showed that during the two years that the parties were 
'Ppi!r.1ted before the trial, the defendant paid directly to the plaintiff $1,200.00 
per :nonth for her support and the support of the minor children who were 
\1v1ng 'ft horn<?, and that in addition he also paid directly the bills and other 
expen"'' of the appellant and the children (R. 85). The defendant confirmed 
thi' and testifierl that his experience was that it cost $800.00 to $1,000.00 
per :n0nth to maintain the home (which he identified as principal, interest, 
t:nes 1ind insurance on the home), which he had also been paying in addition 
to t11e bills Rnd in addition to the $1,200.00 per month which he paid to the 
;:ilarntiff (R. 119-120). 
The amount awarded by the trial court for the support of the appellant 
and the children (Sl,600.00 per month alimony together with $200.00 per month 
per child for three children - or a total of $600.00 for child support - which 
totals 52,200.UO per month) is a fair approximation of the amount that the 
def<:nd1rnt testified he was actually paying directly to the appellant and toward 
tlie exrenscs of maintaining the home during the separation, but would not 
include the other amounts defendant was paying during the separation. 
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stated: 
ln the case of [nc>lish vs. En·rlisl1, .1•i'1 I' c•: 411'.I (l't. I t!lh r•ourt 
.. the court stated that the most i:nport:int function of 
alimony is to provide support for the wife ;is nearlv as possihle 
at the standard of living she enjoyed during mHrriage A.nd to 
prevent the wife from hecoming H puhlic ch11rge. The court 
observed that criteria considered in determining a reasonable 
award for support and maintenance include the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife, the nbility of the wife to 
produce a sufficient income for herself, and the ability of 
the husband to provide support." 
1f in making this awrtrd, the trial court took into consideration the 
needs of the plaintiff and the minor children for support, and the Rbility of 
the husband to pav for their support, and the rrbilitv of the wife to contribute 
to her own support, it failed to clarify the matter 1rnvwhere in the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law or .Judgment. 
The average earnings of the defendant for the three years preceding 
the entry of the decree (defendant's historic earning rrbility) amounted to more 
than per month. 1f ttiat factor was properlv consirler<?d b\' the trial 
court, there would not appear to '>e any reason in the evidence to justifv C!n 
award of alimony A.nd chi\<1 support so far below what the appellant estimated 
would be necessary for her ·ilJpport, so far helow whRt the husband had :1lre11dv 
been pRving during the sepnrntion, rind rarticularlv so far below what the 
evidence demonstrated would he necessCJ.rV to :naintain her and the 
as near\v as possible to the st:in<!nrd of livim:; t!W\' enJO\'ed during the rnarriage . 
. .\lthough the findinl(s don't .vhic!1 income level the ·-d11nony 1\1:1'-' 
on, it would A.ppear that t:1e co11rt 'Nn'i hasi:i<e: t:1e :wiount •Wrlerc'<i rrn t!w 
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,,.,,,,11,1 <lc>re1HJant was earning at the time of trial, rather than on defendant's 
lll,Jor1•' f':irning ability, contrary to the holdings of this court in Westenskow 
'"· \\ <>'1•'r\Skow, .162 P.2d 1246 (Ut. 1977), and English vs. English, supra. For 
tilP pf'otect1on of both parties (in the event a need should arise to request a 
morlificRtion based upon a change of circumstances) this matter should be 
clarified. 
Furthermore, the termination of alimony at an arbitrarily selected 
date was, in the circumstances of this case, a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the trial court. In the English case, supra, the court held that one 
of the most important functions of alimony is to prevent the wife from 
becoming a public charge, and that the criteria to be considered in determining 
a 1·easonable award should include among other things the ability of the wife 
to rroduce a sufficient income for herself. The evidence in this case indicated 
that the appellant, a forty year old woman with no formal job training or 
work experience, had no realistic ability to provide any meaningful income for 
herself. Furthermore, at the time of the hearing there were three minor 
children living with her at home, the youngest of which was three years old. 
To terminate alimony under these conditions would clearly indicate that within 
two years the wife would almost certainly become a public charge. 
ln the case of \1acLean vs. :YlacLean, 523 P.2d 862 (Ut. 1974), the 
,•vir'ence showed that the wife had not been employed for 20 years and was in 
111 h<>alth !although the trial court found that she was capable of gainful 
P'nJ>l•wrnent). As Rn inducement to the wife to seek gainful employment the 
tri>il court lrnd onJered an annual diminution in alimony payments. On appeal 
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employment. The opinion of th<> court st:1ted: 
"We deem it best that the clwnc;es in alimoll\' Pitlwr <1ownw11r<J 
or upward should be left to future deter.minations ')\' the 
court under its continuing jurisdiction." 
In the case of Sava"'e vs. Savno-e, 658 f'.2d !:COi (l't. !Y83), soeakin';' 
on the issue of alimonv, the Ctnh Supreme Court q:ited: 
"We have alre11.dy noted that the parties and t11eir childrr>n 
enjoyed a very high standard of living during the marriage. 
One of the chief functions of an alimonv award lS to permit 
the parties to maintain as much as possible the same qandards 
after the dissolution of the marriage as those enjoyed r:luring 
the m11rriage. . .. where the mqrringe is •)f Jong d11r.1tion 
and the earning capacitv of one spouse r;reatlv exceer1s thqt 
of the other, as here, it is appropri11te to order llirnonv Hnd 
child support at a level which will insure that the supporterl 
spouse and children mf!y maintain a stan<1Hrd of living not 
unduly disproportionate to that •vhicl1 thev "vould have c>nJovrd 
had the marri11ge continued." 
In the Savage case the parties were married twcntv vears, whereas 
in the case at bar the parties were rrnirrierl twentv-two vears. In the <'asc ''t 
bar as in the Sav8.ge case the earning of one spouse (the 
greatly exceeds tilHt of the other spouse (the wife). It sliou1<1 .llso >ie noted 
in passing that the l't3h Sllprerne Court cited Y.S support for the riroposition 
last quoted abovP the case of Steinbrr>nner vs. Steinbrenner. GO nr. :\oo. JOG, 
li52 P.2d 845 (!Y82l. In tlleit ca-;e Hie ')regon S11oreme f'o11rt actuallv stCJted 
as follows: 
- 1 
'"11
11°r" .1 rnnrriage is of long duration and the earning capacity of 
1Hir ''l<Juse greatly cxceeds that of the other, permanent spousal 
is w11rranted .... " (Emphasis added.) 
In view of the great differences in the earning capacity of the parties 
i11 t11" ,.,,,P, it i' respectfully submitted that it is a gross abuse of discretion 
for the trial Judge to arbitrarily limit the payment of alimony for a period of 
two vears f·)l!owing the entry of the decree when there is no indication in 
tile ev1dcrwe tilat within that two year period the appellant will be able to 
JnC'rease h<cr f'arning capacity in any meaningful way. In fact, the only 
reasonHble nntic1pat1on at the time of the trial would be that she would not 
be able to increase her earning capacity in any meaningful way within two 
'.'Pllr'i becc111se of the following factors: 
1. Having married at age eighteen and having devoted herself for 
thP twenty-two years of the marriage to homemaking and nurturing 
activities, which are activites outside the labor market and which 
produce no s1<ills which would suit her for employment, all factors 
militate against her being able within two years to develop any 
marketable s1<ills. Furthermore she will enter the job market at the 
age of appraximately forty-two, when there are greatly reduced 
opportunities for emplovment. 
2. The partie< have a minor child which at the time of the trial 
was three vears old. The award of custody of that child to the 
pla1nt1ff imposes upon her the duty to care for that child. The needs 
of that child would prevent the plaintiff from exerting her efforts in 
the next two years to gain skills which would adapt her for meaningful 
ernplovment. 
' The plaintiff testified that her health at the time of the trial 
woulrl make it very difficult for her to hold gainful employment and 
lt tile same time meet her responsibilities to her children (R. 91-92). 
In his test1monv the respondent recognized the impairment of the 
'1e·llt 11 .1f the ripoellant and stated that he was concerned about it 
·1n<I tli:;t sl1P w<lS not coping well with the situation. (R. 128). 
In this ree-nrd it should i)e noted that when the trial judge first 
111 tile r>n'>l-trial ile:iring that the alimony should be paid for a limited 
time only, counsel for defend:rnt sugg0stcd th:it alirnonv he n1ud for ,1 term 
of ten years. (R. 138). This C'Orresporn1" <:x:wtlv ,,it'1 the suggestion of the 
husband in his financial de<'laration to the effect that "11Jimon:.• sho11Jr! Cie 
awarded for a period of ten years or until plaintiff remarries or C'Ohahits, 
whichever occurs earlier." (R. 25). 
Since there was nothing in the evidence to indicRte that something 
might happen with two years from the time of trial which would substanti11llv 
increase the ability of the plaintiff to provide for herself, but r1ther al! of 
the evidence indicated that no such event would occur, it was a gross abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court to limit the oayment of alimony to 
a two year period. Equity indicates that the award of i!lirnonv should hi!ve 
been made permanent or at least indefinite as to its term. This would not 
operate unfairly as to the interests of the defendant because under Utah law 
the court retains continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes with 
respect to support and maintenance of the parties as shall he re11sonable 1md 
necessary (Sec. 30-3-5 l? .C.A.). If something should in fact materialize (whet!1er 
in two years or thereafter) which would increase the earning capRcity of the 
plaintiff or decrease her necessity or decrease his ability to pay the defendant 
could always move the court for an order modifyrng the amount of alimony 
awarded based upon the change of C'ircumst:rnce. 
L l?SIO '.'J 
Based upon t11e foregoing it is re,1iedf11ll•; sutimttted thHt the trial 
court grossly qtJused its disc·retion: 
- 'l -
1. In hiling to make a division of the business awarded to the 
1110 ''''"r"' ,·,f tl1P marriage by reason of the joint efforts of the parties, and 
'2. In fR1ling to give proper weight to defendant's historic earning 
a'nlitv the <tandard of living of the parties and the needs of the appellant 
nnd the <'h1Mren of the parties in determining the amount of alimony to be 
1. In failing to order the defendant to pay alimony on a permanent 
hHs1s or !it leC1st on an indefinite basis, pending a change of circumstances of 
the parties. 
It is resrectfully further submitted that this court should enter an 
order modifying the decree of the trial court as the interests of justice and 
equitv reauire. 
Respectfully submitted 
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